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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-1883 
______________ 
 
PROVIDENCE PEDIATRIC MEDICAL DAYCARE INC;  
G.V., on behalf of her minor child,  
  M.N.; T. P., on behalf of her minor child J.M.; A. B., on behalf of her  
 minor child T.B.; D. L., on behalf of her minor child J.B.; H. S., 
 on behalf of her minor child C.T. 
 
v. 
 
POONAM ALAIGH, Individually and as Commissioner of the New  
Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services;  
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES;  
JENNIFER VELEZ, Esq., Individually and as Commissioner of the  
Department of Human Services; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES;  
JOHN GUHL, Individually and as Director of the Division of Medical  
Assistance and Health Services; DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND 
HEALTH SERVICES 
 
Providence Pediatric Medical Day Care Inc, 
                                             Appellant  
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. No. 1-10-cv-02799) 
District Judge:  Hon. Noel L. Hillman 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
November 17, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.  
 
(Filed:  December 6, 2016) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Providence Pediatric Medical DayCare, Inc., appeals the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Poonam Alaigh and others (“Defendants”) and 
denying Providence’s cross-motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.  For the reasons set 
forth herein, we will affirm.   
I 
 Providence, a New Jersey corporation, operates several pediatric medical daycare 
(“PMDC”) facilities.  PMDC facilities “provide[ ] medically necessary services to 
technology-dependent children or children with complex medical needs in an ambulatory 
care setting.”  App. 165, 549.  An entity wishing to open, expand, or relocate a PMDC 
facility in New Jersey must obtain a license from the New Jersey Department of Health 
(“DOH”).  The licensing process requires such an entity to submit a project proposal, 
application, and fee to DOH.     
 On September 22, 2003, Providence submitted an application to DOH to expand 
the capacity of its Camden, New Jersey facility from 30 to 114 children, or “slots,” per 
day.  To do so, Providence sought to use both the first and second floors of the building 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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in which it had been operating.  DOH returned the application because state regulations 
allowed a maximum of only 27 slots per facility.   
 On November 3, 2003, DOH imposed a moratorium on applications for new or 
expanded PMDC facilities.  Providence submitted two applications after the moratorium 
began: it re-submitted its earlier application to expand its Camden facility, and it 
submitted an application to obtain a license for a new facility in Berlin, New Jersey.1  
DOH rejected both applications because they were submitted after the moratorium came 
into effect.  During the moratorium, however, Providence was permitted to transfer the 
license for its existing facility in Lawnside, New Jersey to the first floor of its Camden 
building.  Providence thus obtained a license for its expanded Camden facility on 
September 6, 2005.     
 The moratorium was lifted on November 1, 2012, and Providence thereafter 
applied for a license for its Berlin location, which DOH granted on December 5, 2014.     
 Providence filed a Complaint on June 1, 2010, asserting, among other claims, that 
it was denied equal protection on the grounds that Defendants selectively and arbitrarily 
enforced the 27-slot limitation and the moratorium.2  Providence sought damages as well 
as injunctive and declaratory relief.       
                                                                
1 Providence notes that it submitted its initial application for the expanded Camden 
facility and at least began the application process for the Berlin facility prior to the 
moratorium.  The cover letters for its Berlin and (re-submitted) Camden applications 
were dated November 2, 2003, but the overnight mail envelope was dated November 13, 
2003, and the check accompanying the applications was dated November 14, 2003.   
2 Providence also asserted that Defendants: (1) failed to comply with federal 
Medicaid laws, (2) denied it and children in its care equal treatment and comparable care 
as required by Title XIX, (3) failed to administer the Medicaid program efficiently and 
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 Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the 
District Court granted on all but Providence’s equal protection claim for prospective 
injunctive and declaratory relief against the individual defendants in their official 
capacities.  
 Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment on the equal protection 
claim, and Providence cross-moved for, among other things, attorneys’ fees and costs.3  
The District Court granted summary judgment on the equal protection claim on the 
ground that it was moot because Providence had already obtained the two licenses it 
sought and it made no allegations about its ability to obtain licenses in the future or show 
that another moratorium would be imposed.  The District Court denied Providence’s 
cross-motion for fees, finding it was not a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) 
because the issuance of the licenses was not the result of judicial action.  Providence 
appeals.   
II4 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
effectively, and (4) violated due process based on the allegedly selective and arbitrary 
enforcement of the 27-slot limit and the moratorium, as well as the promulgation of new 
clinical eligibility standards.   
3 Providence also cross-moved to reopen discovery, which was denied.  This 
ruling was not appealed. 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s grant or 
denial of summary judgment is plenary.  Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 
F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  We apply the same standard as the District Court, viewing 
facts and making all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler 
Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “An issue is genuine only 
if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-
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A 
 We first consider whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment 
on Providence’s request for injunctive relief on its equal protection claim because it is 
moot. 
 Under Article III, a federal court may “exercise . . . judicial power” only over 
cases or controversies.  Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1987)).  The existence of 
a case or controversy requires “‘(1) a legal controversy that is real and not hypothetical, 
(2) a legal controversy that affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the 
factual predicate for reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal controversy with sufficiently 
adverse parties so as to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution.’”  Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. 
of Boilermakers, 815 F.2d at 915).  Put simply, a case or controversy arises when one 
party asserts that another party has violated its rights. 
 “A case may become moot if (1) the alleged violation has ceased, and there is no 
reasonable expectation that it will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely 
and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violations.”  N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. 
Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 31 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Finberg v. Sullivan, 
658 F.2d 93, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1980)); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the 
suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  The moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make “a 
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the 
burden of proof.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
 6 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (“‘A case might become moot if subsequent 
events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably 
be expected to recur.’” (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 
393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968))).5 
 Providence contends that Defendants violated its equal protection rights in 
connection with licenses it sought to operate facilities in Camden and Berlin.  Events 
after Providence’s 2003 applications, however, eradicated any effects of Defendants’ 
alleged equal protection violation.  In 2005, Providence was permitted to expand its 
Camden facility by transferring a license from another facility.  In 2014, Providence 
applied for and was granted a license to open a facility in Berlin.  In short, Providence 
has already “received the very relief [it] sought” and the effects of Defendants’ actions 
have been eradicated.  Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., --- F.3d ---, 2016 
WL 5219877, at *5 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2016) (dismissing for mootness and noting that the 
appellants’ individual claims had been moot for nearly three years).  Furthermore, there is 
no reasonable expectation of recurrence.  The moratorium has been lifted, no moratoria 
have since been implemented on PMDC facilities, and there is no evidence that any will 
be imposed in the future.  See Hudson v. Robinson, 678 F.2d 462, 465 (3d Cir. 1982) (“If 
a defendant has discontinued challenged activities (as this defendant has), the case is 
moot if there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.”).  Thus, the 
                                                                
5 A defendant’s “[m]ere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not 
moot a case.”  Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. at 203 (citing United 
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)).   
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District Court properly found that Providence’s request for injunctive relief based on its 
equal protection claim is moot.   
B 
 The District Court properly denied Providence’s cross-motion for attorneys’ fees 
and costs because Providence is not a “prevailing party” under § 1988.6  To be a 
prevailing party under § 1988, the plaintiff must “‘at a minimum, . . . be able to point to a 
resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the 
defendant.’”  Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 
U.S. 782, 792 (1989)).  That change “must be the product of judicial action.”  Id.  As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although 
perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the 
necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.”  Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. 
Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001) (rejecting the “catalyst 
theory” as a basis for fees and costs) (emphasis omitted); see also Singer Mgmt. 
Consultants, 650 F.3d at 228 (“[A] plaintiff does not become a ‘prevailing party’ solely 
because his lawsuit causes a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Here, Providence is not a “prevailing party” because the changes in the parties’ 
legal relationship are not the result of any “judicial action.”  The moratorium expired and 
                                                                
6 We exercise plenary review over the question of whether a plaintiff is a 
“prevailing party.”  Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Providence obtained the licenses it had sought since 2003, but not through judicial action.  
See Singer Mgmt. Consultants, 650 F.3d at 229-32 (holding that plaintiff was not a 
prevailing party under § 1988 where the district court had entered a TRO and defendant 
then voluntarily changed its position, thereby “moot[ing] the case at the preliminary 
injunction hearing”).  Because the change in the legal relationship among the parties was 
not the product of any judicial action, the District Court correctly denied Providence’s 
request for fees and costs.7 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                                                
7 To the extent Providence asserts it is a “prevailing party” because its equal 
protection claim survived the first motion for summary judgment, this argument fails.  A 
denial of summary judgment is not a ruling on the merits and does not operate to change 
the parties’ legal relationship.  See Dessar v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 353 
F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1965) (“[A] denial [of a motion for summary judgment] merely 
postpones decision of any question; it decides none.  To give it any other effect would be 
entirely contrary to the purpose of the summary judgment procedure.”). 
